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1107712e37
While the backdoor was inactive (and thus harmless) without inserting
a small trigger code into the build system when the source package was
created, it's good to remove this anyway:
- The executable payloads were embedded as binary blobs in
the test files. This was a blatant violation of the
Debian Free Software Guidelines.
- On machines that see lots bots poking at the SSH port, the backdoor
noticeably increased CPU load, resulting in degraded user experience
and thus overwhelmingly negative user feedback.
- The maintainer who added the backdoor has disappeared.
- Backdoors are bad for security.
This reverts the following without making any other changes:
6e636819 Tests: Update two test files.
a3a29bbd Tests: Test --single-stream can decompress bad-3-corrupt_lzma2.xz.
0b4ccc91 Tests: Update RISC-V test files.
8c9b8b20 liblzma: Fix typos in crc32_fast.c and crc64_fast.c.
82ecc538 liblzma: Fix false Valgrind error report with GCC.
cf44e4b7 Tests: Add a few test files.
3060e107 Tests: Use smaller dictionary size in RISC-V test files.
e2870db5 Tests: Add two RISC-V Filter test files.
The RISC-V test files also have real content that tests the filter
but the real content would fit into much smaller files. A generator
program would need to be available as well.
Thanks to Andres Freund for finding and reporting it and making
it public quickly so others could act without a delay.
See: https://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2024/03/29/4