The API docs clearly say that if error_pos isn't NULL then *error
is always set on any error. However, it wasn't touched if str == NULL
or filters == NULL or unsupported flags were specified.
Fixes: cedeeca2ea
It is logical why it cannot know for sure that the value has
to be at most 4 if it is less than 16.
The x86 filter is based on a very old LZMA SDK version. Newer
ones have quite a different implementation for the same filter.
Thanks to Sam James.
On macOS, we get:
```
signals.c: In function 'signals_init':
signals.c:76:17: error: conversion to 'sigset_t' {aka 'unsigned int'} from 'int' may change the sign of the result [-Werror=sign-conversion]
76 | sigaddset(&hooked_signals, sigs[i]);
| ^~~~~~~~~
signals.c:81:17: error: conversion to 'sigset_t' {aka 'unsigned int'} from 'int' may change the sign of the result [-Werror=sign-conversion]
81 | sigaddset(&hooked_signals, message_progress_sigs[i]);
| ^~~~~~~~~
signals.c:86:9: error: conversion to 'sigset_t' {aka 'unsigned int'} from 'int' may change the sign of the result [-Werror=sign-conversion]
86 | sigaddset(&hooked_signals, SIGTSTP);
| ^~~~~~~~~
```
We use `int` for `hooked_signals` but we can't just cast to whatever
`sigset_t` is because `sigset_t` is an opaque type. It's an unsigned int
on macOS. On macOS, `sigaddset` is implemented as a macro.
Just suppress -Wsign-conversion for `signals_init` for macOS given
there's no real nice way of fixing this.
A few lines were reordered, a few ARRAY_SIZE were changed to sizeof,
and a few uint32_t were changed to size_t. No real functional changes
were intended.
We need this for when we're passing sanitizer flags or -gdwarf-4 for Clang
with Valgrind. Just always start with -O2 if CFLAGS isn't set in the
environment and append what was passed on the command line.
Using `--trace-children=yes` has a trade-off here, as it makes
`test_scripts.sh` pretty slow when calling various non-xz utilities.
But I also feel like it's not useless to have Valgrind used there and it's
not easy to exclude Valgrind just for that one test...
I did consider using AX_VALGRIND_CHECK [0][1] but I couldn't get it working
immediately with some conditionally-built tests and I wondered if it was
worth spending time on at least while we're debating xz's future build
system situation.
[0] https://www.gnu.org/software/autoconf-archive/ax_valgrind_check.html
[1] https://tecnocode.co.uk/2014/12/23/automatically-valgrinding-code-with-ax_valgrind_check/
This is *NOT* done for security reasons even though the backdoor
relied on the ifunc code. Instead, the reason is that in this
project ifunc provides little benefits but it's quite a bit of
extra code to support it. The only case where ifunc *might* matter
for performance is if the CRC functions are used directly by an
application. In normal compression use it's completely irrelevant.
While the backdoor was inactive (and thus harmless) without inserting
a small trigger code into the build system when the source package was
created, it's good to remove this anyway:
- The executable payloads were embedded as binary blobs in
the test files. This was a blatant violation of the
Debian Free Software Guidelines.
- On machines that see lots bots poking at the SSH port, the backdoor
noticeably increased CPU load, resulting in degraded user experience
and thus overwhelmingly negative user feedback.
- The maintainer who added the backdoor has disappeared.
- Backdoors are bad for security.
This reverts the following without making any other changes:
6e636819 Tests: Update two test files.
a3a29bbd Tests: Test --single-stream can decompress bad-3-corrupt_lzma2.xz.
0b4ccc91 Tests: Update RISC-V test files.
8c9b8b20 liblzma: Fix typos in crc32_fast.c and crc64_fast.c.
82ecc538 liblzma: Fix false Valgrind error report with GCC.
cf44e4b7 Tests: Add a few test files.
3060e107 Tests: Use smaller dictionary size in RISC-V test files.
e2870db5 Tests: Add two RISC-V Filter test files.
The RISC-V test files also have real content that tests the filter
but the real content would fit into much smaller files. A generator
program would need to be available as well.
Thanks to Andres Freund for finding and reporting it and making
it public quickly so others could act without a delay.
See: https://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2024/03/29/4
Lasse Collin
Sam James
Ryan Carsten Schmidt
Jia Tan