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Claims via embedded structs rather than generics: - Decode(token, &claims) pattern: JSON payload unmarshaled directly into the caller's pre-allocated struct, stored in jws.Claims; custom fields accessible through the local variable without a type assertion - StandardClaims.Validate promoted to any embedding struct via value receiver; override Validate on the outer struct for custom checks, calling ValidateStandardClaims to preserve standard OIDC validation - Sign(crypto.Signer): algorithm set from key.Public() type switch; ES256 (P-256) and RS256 (PKCS#1 v1.5) supported; works with HSM/KMS - ecdsaDERToRaw: converts ASN.1 DER output of crypto.Signer to raw r||s - SignES256 uses FillBytes for correct zero-padded r||s (no leading-zero bug) - UnsafeVerify(Key): dispatches on Header.Alg; ES256 and RS256 supported - Non-generic PublicJWK with ECDSA()/RSA() typed accessor methods (contrast: bestjwt uses generic PublicJWK[K] + TypedKeys[K]) - JWKS fetch/parse: FetchPublicJWKs, ReadPublicJWKs, UnmarshalPublicJWKs for RSA and EC (P-256/384/521) keys - 10 tests covering round trips, promoted/overridden validate, wrong key, wrong key type, unknown alg, JWKS accessors, and JWKS JSON parsing
598 lines
19 KiB
Go
598 lines
19 KiB
Go
// Copyright 2025 AJ ONeal <aj@therootcompany.com> (https://therootcompany.com)
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//
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// This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public
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// License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this
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// file, You can obtain one at https://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/.
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//
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// SPDX-License-Identifier: MPL-2.0
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package embeddedjwt
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import (
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"crypto"
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"crypto/ecdsa"
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"crypto/elliptic"
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"crypto/rand"
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"crypto/rsa"
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"crypto/sha256"
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"encoding/asn1"
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"encoding/base64"
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"encoding/json"
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"fmt"
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"math/big"
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"slices"
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"strings"
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"time"
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)
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// Claims is the interface that custom claims types must satisfy.
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//
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// Because [StandardClaims] implements Claims with a value receiver, any struct
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// that embeds StandardClaims satisfies Claims automatically via method promotion
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// — no boilerplate required. Override Validate on the outer struct to add
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// application-specific checks.
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type Claims interface {
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Validate(params ValidateParams) ([]string, error)
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}
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// JWS is a decoded JSON Web Signature / JWT.
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//
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// Claims is stored as the [Claims] interface so that any embedded-struct type
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// can be used without generics. Access the concrete type via type assertion or,
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// more conveniently, via the pointer you passed to [Decode].
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//
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// Typical usage:
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//
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// var claims AppClaims
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// jws, err := embeddedjwt.Decode(tokenString, &claims)
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// jws.UnsafeVerify(pubKey)
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// errs, err := jws.Validate(params)
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// // claims.Email, claims.Roles, etc. are already populated
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type JWS struct {
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Protected string `json:"-"` // base64url-encoded header
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Header StandardHeader `json:"header"`
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Payload string `json:"-"` // base64url-encoded claims
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Claims Claims `json:"claims"`
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Signature URLBase64 `json:"signature"`
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Verified bool `json:"-"`
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}
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// StandardHeader holds the standard JOSE header fields.
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type StandardHeader struct {
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Alg string `json:"alg"`
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Kid string `json:"kid"`
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Typ string `json:"typ"`
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}
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// StandardClaims holds the registered JWT claim names defined in RFC 7519
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// and extended by OpenID Connect Core.
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//
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// Embed StandardClaims in your own struct to satisfy [Claims] automatically:
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//
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// type AppClaims struct {
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// embeddedjwt.StandardClaims
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// Email string `json:"email"`
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// }
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// // AppClaims now satisfies Claims via promoted Validate.
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// // Override Validate on AppClaims to add custom checks.
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type StandardClaims struct {
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Iss string `json:"iss"`
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Sub string `json:"sub"`
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Aud string `json:"aud"`
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Exp int64 `json:"exp"`
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Iat int64 `json:"iat"`
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AuthTime int64 `json:"auth_time"`
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Nonce string `json:"nonce,omitempty"`
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Amr []string `json:"amr"`
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Azp string `json:"azp,omitempty"`
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Jti string `json:"jti"`
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}
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// Validate implements [Claims] by checking all standard OIDC/JWT claim fields.
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//
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// This method is promoted to any struct that embeds [StandardClaims], so
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// embedding structs satisfy Claims without writing any additional code.
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// params.Now must be non-zero; [JWS.Validate] ensures this before delegating.
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func (c StandardClaims) Validate(params ValidateParams) ([]string, error) {
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return ValidateStandardClaims(c, params)
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}
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// Decode parses a compact JWT string (header.payload.signature) into a JWS.
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//
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// claims must be a pointer to the caller's pre-allocated claims struct
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// (e.g. &AppClaims{}). The JSON payload is unmarshaled directly into it,
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// and the same pointer is stored in jws.Claims. This means callers can
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// access custom fields through their own variable without a type assertion:
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//
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// var claims AppClaims
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// jws, err := embeddedjwt.Decode(token, &claims)
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// // claims.Email is already set; no type assertion needed
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//
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// The signature is not verified by Decode. Call [JWS.UnsafeVerify] first.
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func Decode(tokenStr string, claims Claims) (*JWS, error) {
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parts := strings.Split(tokenStr, ".")
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if len(parts) != 3 {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("invalid JWT format")
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}
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var jws JWS
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var sigEnc string
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jws.Protected, jws.Payload, sigEnc = parts[0], parts[1], parts[2]
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header, err := base64.RawURLEncoding.DecodeString(jws.Protected)
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if err != nil {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("invalid header encoding: %v", err)
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}
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if err := json.Unmarshal(header, &jws.Header); err != nil {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("invalid header JSON: %v", err)
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}
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payload, err := base64.RawURLEncoding.DecodeString(jws.Payload)
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if err != nil {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("invalid claims encoding: %v", err)
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}
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// Unmarshal into the concrete type behind the Claims interface.
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// json.Unmarshal receives the concrete pointer via reflection.
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if err := json.Unmarshal(payload, claims); err != nil {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("invalid claims JSON: %v", err)
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}
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if err := jws.Signature.UnmarshalJSON([]byte(sigEnc)); err != nil {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("invalid signature encoding: %v", err)
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}
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jws.Claims = claims
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return &jws, nil
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}
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// NewJWSFromClaims creates an unsigned JWS from the provided claims.
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//
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// kid identifies the signing key. The "alg" header field is set automatically
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// when [JWS.Sign] is called. Call [JWS.Encode] to produce a compact JWT string
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// after signing.
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func NewJWSFromClaims(claims Claims, kid string) (*JWS, error) {
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var jws JWS
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jws.Header = StandardHeader{
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// Alg is set by Sign based on the key type.
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Kid: kid,
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Typ: "JWT",
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}
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headerJSON, _ := json.Marshal(jws.Header)
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jws.Protected = base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString(headerJSON)
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claimsJSON, _ := json.Marshal(claims)
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jws.Payload = base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString(claimsJSON)
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jws.Claims = claims
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return &jws, nil
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}
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// Sign signs the JWS in-place using the provided [crypto.Signer].
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// It sets the "alg" header field based on the public key type and re-encodes
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// the protected header before signing, so the signed input is always consistent.
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//
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// Supported public key types (via Signer.Public()):
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// - *ecdsa.PublicKey → ES256 (ECDSA P-256, raw r||s)
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// - *rsa.PublicKey → RS256 (PKCS#1 v1.5 + SHA-256)
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//
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// Because the parameter is [crypto.Signer] rather than a concrete key type,
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// hardware-backed keys (HSM, OS keychain, etc.) work without modification.
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func (jws *JWS) Sign(key crypto.Signer) ([]byte, error) {
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switch pub := key.Public().(type) {
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case *ecdsa.PublicKey:
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jws.Header.Alg = "ES256"
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headerJSON, _ := json.Marshal(jws.Header)
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jws.Protected = base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString(headerJSON)
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hash := sha256.Sum256([]byte(jws.Protected + "." + jws.Payload))
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// crypto.Signer returns ASN.1 DER for ECDSA; convert to raw r||s for JWS.
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derSig, err := key.Sign(rand.Reader, hash[:], crypto.SHA256)
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if err != nil {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("Sign ES256: %w", err)
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}
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jws.Signature, err = ecdsaDERToRaw(derSig, pub.Curve)
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return jws.Signature, err
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case *rsa.PublicKey:
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jws.Header.Alg = "RS256"
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headerJSON, _ := json.Marshal(jws.Header)
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jws.Protected = base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString(headerJSON)
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hash := sha256.Sum256([]byte(jws.Protected + "." + jws.Payload))
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// crypto.Signer returns raw PKCS#1 v1.5 bytes for RSA; use directly.
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var err error
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jws.Signature, err = key.Sign(rand.Reader, hash[:], crypto.SHA256)
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return jws.Signature, err
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default:
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("Sign: unsupported public key type %T (supported: *ecdsa.PublicKey, *rsa.PublicKey)", key.Public())
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}
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}
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// Encode produces the compact JWT string (header.payload.signature).
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func (jws JWS) Encode() string {
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sigEnc := base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString(jws.Signature)
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return jws.Protected + "." + jws.Payload + "." + sigEnc
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}
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// UnsafeVerify checks the signature using the algorithm in the JWT header and
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// sets jws.Verified on success. It only checks the signature — use
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// [JWS.Validate] to check claim values.
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//
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// pub must be of the concrete type matching the header alg (e.g.
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// *ecdsa.PublicKey for ES256). Callers can pass PublicJWK.Key directly
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// without a type assertion.
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//
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// Currently supported: ES256, RS256.
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func (jws *JWS) UnsafeVerify(pub Key) bool {
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signingInput := jws.Protected + "." + jws.Payload
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hash := sha256.Sum256([]byte(signingInput))
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switch jws.Header.Alg {
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case "ES256":
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k, ok := pub.(*ecdsa.PublicKey)
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if !ok || len(jws.Signature) != 64 {
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jws.Verified = false
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return false
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}
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r := new(big.Int).SetBytes(jws.Signature[:32])
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s := new(big.Int).SetBytes(jws.Signature[32:])
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jws.Verified = ecdsa.Verify(k, hash[:], r, s)
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case "RS256":
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k, ok := pub.(*rsa.PublicKey)
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if !ok {
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jws.Verified = false
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return false
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}
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jws.Verified = rsa.VerifyPKCS1v15(k, crypto.SHA256, hash[:], jws.Signature) == nil
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default:
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jws.Verified = false
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}
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return jws.Verified
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}
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// Validate sets params.Now if zero, then delegates to jws.Claims.Validate and
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// additionally enforces that the signature was verified (unless params.IgnoreSig).
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func (jws *JWS) Validate(params ValidateParams) ([]string, error) {
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if params.Now.IsZero() {
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params.Now = time.Now()
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}
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errs, _ := jws.Claims.Validate(params)
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if !params.IgnoreSig && !jws.Verified {
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errs = append(errs, "signature was not checked")
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}
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if len(errs) > 0 {
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timeInfo := fmt.Sprintf("info: server time is %s", params.Now.Format("2006-01-02 15:04:05 MST"))
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if loc, err := time.LoadLocation("Local"); err == nil {
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timeInfo += fmt.Sprintf(" %s", loc)
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}
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errs = append(errs, timeInfo)
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return errs, fmt.Errorf("has errors")
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}
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return nil, nil
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}
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// ValidateParams holds validation configuration.
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// https://openid.net/specs/openid-connect-core-1_0.html#IDToken
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type ValidateParams struct {
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Now time.Time
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IgnoreIss bool
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Iss string
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IgnoreSub bool
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Sub string
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IgnoreAud bool
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Aud string
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IgnoreExp bool
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IgnoreJti bool
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Jti string
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IgnoreIat bool
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IgnoreAuthTime bool
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MaxAge time.Duration
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IgnoreNonce bool
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Nonce string
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IgnoreAmr bool
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RequiredAmrs []string
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IgnoreAzp bool
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Azp string
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IgnoreSig bool
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}
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// ValidateStandardClaims checks the registered JWT/OIDC claim fields.
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//
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// This is called by [StandardClaims.Validate] and is exported so that
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// custom claims types can call it from an overriding Validate method:
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//
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// func (c AppClaims) Validate(params embeddedjwt.ValidateParams) ([]string, error) {
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// errs, _ := embeddedjwt.ValidateStandardClaims(c.StandardClaims, params)
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// if c.Email == "" {
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// errs = append(errs, "missing email claim")
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// }
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// if len(errs) > 0 {
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// return errs, fmt.Errorf("has errors")
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// }
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// return nil, nil
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// }
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//
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// params.Now must be non-zero; [JWS.Validate] ensures this before delegating.
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func ValidateStandardClaims(claims StandardClaims, params ValidateParams) ([]string, error) {
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var errs []string
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// Required to exist and match
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if len(params.Iss) > 0 || !params.IgnoreIss {
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if len(claims.Iss) == 0 {
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errs = append(errs, "missing or malformed 'iss' (token issuer, identifier for public key)")
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} else if claims.Iss != params.Iss {
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errs = append(errs, fmt.Sprintf("'iss' (token issuer) mismatch: got %s, expected %s", claims.Iss, params.Iss))
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}
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}
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// Required to exist, optional match
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if len(claims.Sub) == 0 {
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if !params.IgnoreSub {
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errs = append(errs, "missing or malformed 'sub' (subject, typically pairwise user id)")
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}
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} else if len(params.Sub) > 0 {
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if params.Sub != claims.Sub {
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errs = append(errs, fmt.Sprintf("'sub' (subject) mismatch: got %s, expected %s", claims.Sub, params.Sub))
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}
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}
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// Required to exist and match
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if len(params.Aud) > 0 || !params.IgnoreAud {
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if len(claims.Aud) == 0 {
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errs = append(errs, "missing or malformed 'aud' (audience receiving token)")
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} else if claims.Aud != params.Aud {
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errs = append(errs, fmt.Sprintf("'aud' (audience) mismatch: got %s, expected %s", claims.Aud, params.Aud))
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}
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}
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// Required to exist and not be in the past
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if !params.IgnoreExp {
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if claims.Exp <= 0 {
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errs = append(errs, "missing or malformed 'exp' (expiration date in seconds)")
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} else if claims.Exp < params.Now.Unix() {
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duration := time.Since(time.Unix(claims.Exp, 0))
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expTime := time.Unix(claims.Exp, 0).Format("2006-01-02 15:04:05 MST")
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errs = append(errs, fmt.Sprintf("token expired %s ago (%s)", formatDuration(duration), expTime))
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}
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}
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// Required to exist and not be in the future
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if !params.IgnoreIat {
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if claims.Iat <= 0 {
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errs = append(errs, "missing or malformed 'iat' (issued at, when token was signed)")
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} else if claims.Iat > params.Now.Unix() {
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duration := time.Unix(claims.Iat, 0).Sub(params.Now)
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iatTime := time.Unix(claims.Iat, 0).Format("2006-01-02 15:04:05 MST")
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errs = append(errs, fmt.Sprintf("'iat' (issued at) is %s in the future (%s)", formatDuration(duration), iatTime))
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}
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}
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// Should exist, in the past, with optional max age
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if params.MaxAge > 0 || !params.IgnoreAuthTime {
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if claims.AuthTime == 0 {
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errs = append(errs, "missing or malformed 'auth_time' (time of real-world user authentication, in seconds)")
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} else {
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authTime := time.Unix(claims.AuthTime, 0)
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authTimeStr := authTime.Format("2006-01-02 15:04:05 MST")
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age := params.Now.Sub(authTime)
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diff := age - params.MaxAge
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if claims.AuthTime > params.Now.Unix() {
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fromNow := time.Unix(claims.AuthTime, 0).Sub(params.Now)
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errs = append(errs, fmt.Sprintf(
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"'auth_time' of %s is %s in the future (server time %s)",
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authTimeStr, formatDuration(fromNow), params.Now.Format("2006-01-02 15:04:05 MST")),
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)
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} else if params.MaxAge > 0 && age > params.MaxAge {
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errs = append(errs, fmt.Sprintf(
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"'auth_time' of %s is %s old, exceeding max age %s by %s",
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authTimeStr, formatDuration(age), formatDuration(params.MaxAge), formatDuration(diff)),
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)
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}
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}
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}
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// Optional exact match
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if params.Jti != claims.Jti {
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if len(params.Jti) > 0 {
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errs = append(errs, fmt.Sprintf("'jti' (jwt id) mismatch: got %s, expected %s", claims.Jti, params.Jti))
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} else if !params.IgnoreJti {
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errs = append(errs, fmt.Sprintf("unchecked 'jti' (jwt id): %s", claims.Jti))
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}
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}
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// Optional exact match
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if params.Nonce != claims.Nonce {
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if len(params.Nonce) > 0 {
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errs = append(errs, fmt.Sprintf("'nonce' mismatch: got %s, expected %s", claims.Nonce, params.Nonce))
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} else if !params.IgnoreNonce {
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errs = append(errs, fmt.Sprintf("unchecked 'nonce': %s", claims.Nonce))
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}
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}
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// Should exist, optional required-set check
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if !params.IgnoreAmr {
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if len(claims.Amr) == 0 {
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errs = append(errs, "missing or malformed 'amr' (authorization methods, as json list)")
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} else if len(params.RequiredAmrs) > 0 {
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for _, required := range params.RequiredAmrs {
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if !slices.Contains(claims.Amr, required) {
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errs = append(errs, fmt.Sprintf("missing required '%s' from 'amr'", required))
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}
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}
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}
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}
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// Optional, match if present
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if params.Azp != claims.Azp {
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if len(params.Azp) > 0 {
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errs = append(errs, fmt.Sprintf("'azp' (authorized party) mismatch: got %s, expected %s", claims.Azp, params.Azp))
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} else if !params.IgnoreAzp {
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errs = append(errs, fmt.Sprintf("unchecked 'azp' (authorized party): %s", claims.Azp))
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}
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}
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if len(errs) > 0 {
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return errs, fmt.Errorf("has errors")
|
|
}
|
|
return nil, nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// --- Private key / signing helpers ---
|
|
|
|
// JWK represents a private key in JSON Web Key format (EC only).
|
|
type JWK struct {
|
|
Kty string `json:"kty"`
|
|
Crv string `json:"crv"`
|
|
D string `json:"d"`
|
|
X string `json:"x"`
|
|
Y string `json:"y"`
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// UnmarshalJWK parses an EC private key from a JWK struct.
|
|
func UnmarshalJWK(jwk JWK) (*ecdsa.PrivateKey, error) {
|
|
x, err := base64.RawURLEncoding.DecodeString(jwk.X)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return nil, fmt.Errorf("invalid JWK X: %v", err)
|
|
}
|
|
y, err := base64.RawURLEncoding.DecodeString(jwk.Y)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return nil, fmt.Errorf("invalid JWK Y: %v", err)
|
|
}
|
|
d, err := base64.RawURLEncoding.DecodeString(jwk.D)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return nil, fmt.Errorf("invalid JWK D: %v", err)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return &ecdsa.PrivateKey{
|
|
PublicKey: ecdsa.PublicKey{
|
|
Curve: elliptic.P256(),
|
|
X: new(big.Int).SetBytes(x),
|
|
Y: new(big.Int).SetBytes(y),
|
|
},
|
|
D: new(big.Int).SetBytes(d),
|
|
}, nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Thumbprint computes the RFC 7638 JWK Thumbprint for an EC public key.
|
|
func (jwk JWK) Thumbprint() (string, error) {
|
|
data := map[string]string{
|
|
"crv": jwk.Crv,
|
|
"kty": jwk.Kty,
|
|
"x": jwk.X,
|
|
"y": jwk.Y,
|
|
}
|
|
jsonData, err := json.Marshal(data)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return "", err
|
|
}
|
|
hash := sha256.Sum256(jsonData)
|
|
return base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString(hash[:]), nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// SignES256 computes an ES256 signature over header.payload.
|
|
// The signature is a fixed-width raw r||s value (not ASN.1 DER).
|
|
// r and s are zero-padded to the curve's byte length via [big.Int.FillBytes].
|
|
func SignES256(header, payload string, key *ecdsa.PrivateKey) ([]byte, error) {
|
|
hash := sha256.Sum256([]byte(header + "." + payload))
|
|
r, s, err := ecdsa.Sign(rand.Reader, key, hash[:])
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return nil, fmt.Errorf("SignES256: %w", err)
|
|
}
|
|
byteLen := (key.Curve.Params().BitSize + 7) / 8
|
|
out := make([]byte, 2*byteLen)
|
|
r.FillBytes(out[:byteLen])
|
|
s.FillBytes(out[byteLen:])
|
|
return out, nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// SignRS256 computes an RS256 (PKCS#1 v1.5 + SHA-256) signature over header.payload.
|
|
func SignRS256(header, payload string, key *rsa.PrivateKey) ([]byte, error) {
|
|
hash := sha256.Sum256([]byte(header + "." + payload))
|
|
sig, err := rsa.SignPKCS1v15(rand.Reader, key, crypto.SHA256, hash[:])
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return nil, fmt.Errorf("SignRS256: %w", err)
|
|
}
|
|
return sig, nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// ecdsaDERToRaw converts an ASN.1 DER ECDSA signature (as returned by
|
|
// [crypto.Signer]) to the fixed-width r||s format required by JWS.
|
|
func ecdsaDERToRaw(der []byte, curve elliptic.Curve) ([]byte, error) {
|
|
var sig struct{ R, S *big.Int }
|
|
if _, err := asn1.Unmarshal(der, &sig); err != nil {
|
|
return nil, fmt.Errorf("ecdsaDERToRaw: %w", err)
|
|
}
|
|
byteLen := (curve.Params().BitSize + 7) / 8
|
|
out := make([]byte, 2*byteLen)
|
|
sig.R.FillBytes(out[:byteLen])
|
|
sig.S.FillBytes(out[byteLen:])
|
|
return out, nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// EncodeToJWT appends a base64url-encoded signature to a signing input.
|
|
func EncodeToJWT(signingInput string, signature []byte) string {
|
|
sigEnc := base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString(signature)
|
|
return signingInput + "." + sigEnc
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// URLBase64 is a []byte that marshals to/from raw base64url in JSON.
|
|
type URLBase64 []byte
|
|
|
|
func (s URLBase64) String() string {
|
|
return base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString(s)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func (s URLBase64) MarshalJSON() ([]byte, error) {
|
|
encoded := base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString(s)
|
|
return json.Marshal(encoded)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func (s *URLBase64) UnmarshalJSON(data []byte) error {
|
|
dst, err := base64.RawURLEncoding.AppendDecode([]byte{}, data)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return fmt.Errorf("decode base64url signature: %w", err)
|
|
}
|
|
*s = dst
|
|
return nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func formatDuration(d time.Duration) string {
|
|
if d < 0 {
|
|
d = -d
|
|
}
|
|
days := int(d / (24 * time.Hour))
|
|
d -= time.Duration(days) * 24 * time.Hour
|
|
hours := int(d / time.Hour)
|
|
d -= time.Duration(hours) * time.Hour
|
|
minutes := int(d / time.Minute)
|
|
d -= time.Duration(minutes) * time.Minute
|
|
seconds := int(d / time.Second)
|
|
|
|
var parts []string
|
|
if days > 0 {
|
|
parts = append(parts, fmt.Sprintf("%dd", days))
|
|
}
|
|
if hours > 0 {
|
|
parts = append(parts, fmt.Sprintf("%dh", hours))
|
|
}
|
|
if minutes > 0 {
|
|
parts = append(parts, fmt.Sprintf("%dm", minutes))
|
|
}
|
|
if seconds > 0 || len(parts) == 0 {
|
|
parts = append(parts, fmt.Sprintf("%ds", seconds))
|
|
}
|
|
if seconds == 0 || len(parts) == 0 {
|
|
d -= time.Duration(seconds) * time.Second
|
|
millis := int(d / time.Millisecond)
|
|
parts = append(parts, fmt.Sprintf("%dms", millis))
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return strings.Join(parts, " ")
|
|
}
|