feat(auth/genericjwt): add generics-based JWT/JWS/JWK package

Implements JWS[C Validatable] generic over the claims type, with a
package-level Decode[C] function (Go disallows generic methods).
Claims are directly typed as C — no interface or type assertion needed
at use sites. PublicJWK[K Key] and TypedKeys[K] provide generic
key management. Supports ES256 and RS256 via crypto.Signer.
This commit is contained in:
AJ ONeal 2026-03-12 17:55:46 -06:00
parent 83b22dbb86
commit ab898e4444
No known key found for this signature in database
4 changed files with 1082 additions and 0 deletions

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auth/genericjwt/go.mod Normal file
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module github.com/therootcompany/golib/auth/genericjwt
go 1.24.0

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auth/genericjwt/jwt.go Normal file
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// Copyright 2025 AJ ONeal <aj@therootcompany.com> (https://therootcompany.com)
//
// This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public
// License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this
// file, You can obtain one at https://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/.
//
// SPDX-License-Identifier: MPL-2.0
package genericjwt
import (
"crypto"
"crypto/ecdsa"
"crypto/elliptic"
"crypto/rand"
"crypto/rsa"
"crypto/sha256"
"encoding/asn1"
"encoding/base64"
"encoding/json"
"fmt"
"math/big"
"slices"
"strings"
"time"
)
// Validatable is the constraint for the Claims type parameter C.
//
// Custom claims types must implement Validate so that [JWS.Validate] can
// delegate claim-specific logic to the claims type itself. Implementations
// should call [ValidateStandardClaims] for the embedded [StandardClaims] and
// append any application-specific checks.
//
// Note: params.Now is set to time.Now() by [JWS.Validate] before delegation,
// so implementations may rely on it being non-zero.
type Validatable interface {
Validate(params ValidateParams) ([]string, error)
}
// JWS is a decoded JSON Web Signature / JWT, generic over the claims type C.
//
// Typical usage:
//
// jws, err := genericjwt.Decode[MyClaims](tokenString)
// jws.UnsafeVerify(pubKey)
// errs, err := jws.Validate(params)
type JWS[C Validatable] struct {
Protected string `json:"-"` // base64url-encoded header
Header StandardHeader `json:"header"`
Payload string `json:"-"` // base64url-encoded claims
Claims C `json:"claims"`
Signature URLBase64 `json:"signature"`
Verified bool `json:"-"`
}
// StandardHeader holds the standard JOSE header fields.
type StandardHeader struct {
Alg string `json:"alg"`
Kid string `json:"kid"`
Typ string `json:"typ"`
}
// StandardClaims holds the registered JWT claim names defined in RFC 7519
// and extended by OpenID Connect Core.
type StandardClaims struct {
Iss string `json:"iss"`
Sub string `json:"sub"`
Aud string `json:"aud"`
Exp int64 `json:"exp"`
Iat int64 `json:"iat"`
AuthTime int64 `json:"auth_time"`
Nonce string `json:"nonce,omitempty"`
Amr []string `json:"amr"`
Azp string `json:"azp,omitempty"`
Jti string `json:"jti"`
}
// Decode parses a compact JWT string (header.payload.signature) into a JWS[C].
//
// It does not verify the signature. Call [JWS.UnsafeVerify] before [JWS.Validate].
func Decode[C Validatable](tokenStr string) (JWS[C], error) {
parts := strings.Split(tokenStr, ".")
if len(parts) != 3 {
return JWS[C]{}, fmt.Errorf("invalid JWT format")
}
var jws JWS[C]
var sigEnc string
jws.Protected, jws.Payload, sigEnc = parts[0], parts[1], parts[2]
header, err := base64.RawURLEncoding.DecodeString(jws.Protected)
if err != nil {
return jws, fmt.Errorf("invalid header encoding: %v", err)
}
if err := json.Unmarshal(header, &jws.Header); err != nil {
return jws, fmt.Errorf("invalid header JSON: %v", err)
}
payload, err := base64.RawURLEncoding.DecodeString(jws.Payload)
if err != nil {
return jws, fmt.Errorf("invalid claims encoding: %v", err)
}
if err := json.Unmarshal(payload, &jws.Claims); err != nil {
return jws, fmt.Errorf("invalid claims JSON: %v", err)
}
if err := jws.Signature.UnmarshalJSON([]byte(sigEnc)); err != nil {
return jws, fmt.Errorf("invalid signature encoding: %v", err)
}
return jws, nil
}
// NewJWSFromClaims creates an unsigned JWS[C] from the provided claims.
//
// kid identifies the signing key (used to populate the header's "kid" field).
// The "alg" header field is set automatically when [JWS.Sign] is called.
// Call [JWS.Encode] to produce a compact JWT string after signing.
func NewJWSFromClaims[C Validatable](claims C, kid string) (JWS[C], error) {
var jws JWS[C]
jws.Header = StandardHeader{
// Alg is set by Sign based on the key type.
Kid: kid,
Typ: "JWT",
}
headerJSON, _ := json.Marshal(jws.Header)
jws.Protected = base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString(headerJSON)
claimsJSON, _ := json.Marshal(claims)
jws.Payload = base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString(claimsJSON)
jws.Claims = claims
return jws, nil
}
// Sign signs the JWS in-place using the provided [crypto.Signer].
// It determines the algorithm from the signer's public key type, sets the
// "alg" header field, re-encodes the protected header, then signs.
//
// Supported public key types:
// - *ecdsa.PublicKey → ES256 (ECDSA P-256, raw r||s)
// - *rsa.PublicKey → RS256 (PKCS#1 v1.5 + SHA-256)
//
// Because the parameter is [crypto.Signer] rather than a concrete key type,
// hardware-backed keys (HSM, OS keychain, etc.) work without modification.
func (jws *JWS[C]) Sign(key crypto.Signer) ([]byte, error) {
switch pub := key.Public().(type) {
case *ecdsa.PublicKey:
jws.Header.Alg = "ES256"
headerJSON, _ := json.Marshal(jws.Header)
jws.Protected = base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString(headerJSON)
hash := sha256.Sum256([]byte(jws.Protected + "." + jws.Payload))
// crypto.Signer returns ASN.1 DER for ECDSA; convert to raw r||s for JWS.
derSig, err := key.Sign(rand.Reader, hash[:], crypto.SHA256)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("Sign ES256: %w", err)
}
jws.Signature, err = ecdsaDERToRaw(derSig, pub.Curve)
return jws.Signature, err
case *rsa.PublicKey:
jws.Header.Alg = "RS256"
headerJSON, _ := json.Marshal(jws.Header)
jws.Protected = base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString(headerJSON)
hash := sha256.Sum256([]byte(jws.Protected + "." + jws.Payload))
// crypto.Signer returns raw PKCS#1 v1.5 bytes for RSA; use directly.
var err error
jws.Signature, err = key.Sign(rand.Reader, hash[:], crypto.SHA256)
return jws.Signature, err
default:
return nil, fmt.Errorf("Sign: unsupported public key type %T (supported: *ecdsa.PublicKey, *rsa.PublicKey)", key.Public())
}
}
// Encode produces the compact JWT string (header.payload.signature).
func (jws JWS[C]) Encode() string {
sigEnc := base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString(jws.Signature)
return jws.Protected + "." + jws.Payload + "." + sigEnc
}
// UnsafeVerify checks the signature using the algorithm in the JWT header and
// sets jws.Verified on success. It only checks the signature — use
// [JWS.Validate] to check claim values.
//
// pub must be of the concrete type matching the header alg (e.g.
// *ecdsa.PublicKey for ES256). Callers can pass PublicJWK[K].Key directly
// without first narrowing to a concrete type.
//
// Currently supported: ES256, RS256.
func (jws *JWS[C]) UnsafeVerify(pub Key) bool {
signingInput := jws.Protected + "." + jws.Payload
hash := sha256.Sum256([]byte(signingInput))
switch jws.Header.Alg {
case "ES256":
k, ok := pub.(*ecdsa.PublicKey)
if !ok || len(jws.Signature) != 64 {
jws.Verified = false
return false
}
r := new(big.Int).SetBytes(jws.Signature[:32])
s := new(big.Int).SetBytes(jws.Signature[32:])
jws.Verified = ecdsa.Verify(k, hash[:], r, s)
case "RS256":
k, ok := pub.(*rsa.PublicKey)
if !ok {
jws.Verified = false
return false
}
jws.Verified = rsa.VerifyPKCS1v15(k, crypto.SHA256, hash[:], jws.Signature) == nil
default:
jws.Verified = false
}
return jws.Verified
}
// Validate sets params.Now if zero, then delegates to jws.Claims.Validate and
// additionally enforces that the signature was verified (unless params.IgnoreSig).
//
// Returns a list of human-readable errors and a non-nil sentinel if any exist.
func (jws *JWS[C]) Validate(params ValidateParams) ([]string, error) {
if params.Now.IsZero() {
params.Now = time.Now()
}
errs, _ := jws.Claims.Validate(params)
if !params.IgnoreSig && !jws.Verified {
errs = append(errs, "signature was not checked")
}
if len(errs) > 0 {
timeInfo := fmt.Sprintf("info: server time is %s", params.Now.Format("2006-01-02 15:04:05 MST"))
if loc, err := time.LoadLocation("Local"); err == nil {
timeInfo += fmt.Sprintf(" %s", loc)
}
errs = append(errs, timeInfo)
return errs, fmt.Errorf("has errors")
}
return nil, nil
}
// ValidateParams holds validation configuration.
// https://openid.net/specs/openid-connect-core-1_0.html#IDToken
type ValidateParams struct {
Now time.Time
IgnoreIss bool
Iss string
IgnoreSub bool
Sub string
IgnoreAud bool
Aud string
IgnoreExp bool
IgnoreJti bool
Jti string
IgnoreIat bool
IgnoreAuthTime bool
MaxAge time.Duration
IgnoreNonce bool
Nonce string
IgnoreAmr bool
RequiredAmrs []string
IgnoreAzp bool
Azp string
IgnoreSig bool
}
// ValidateStandardClaims checks the registered JWT/OIDC claim fields.
//
// This is the shared implementation that custom claims types should call
// from their [Validatable.Validate] method. It does NOT check the signature
// or append the server-time info line (both are handled by [JWS.Validate]).
//
// params.Now must be non-zero; [JWS.Validate] ensures this before delegating.
func ValidateStandardClaims(claims StandardClaims, params ValidateParams) ([]string, error) {
var errs []string
// Required to exist and match
if len(params.Iss) > 0 || !params.IgnoreIss {
if len(claims.Iss) == 0 {
errs = append(errs, "missing or malformed 'iss' (token issuer, identifier for public key)")
} else if claims.Iss != params.Iss {
errs = append(errs, fmt.Sprintf("'iss' (token issuer) mismatch: got %s, expected %s", claims.Iss, params.Iss))
}
}
// Required to exist, optional match
if len(claims.Sub) == 0 {
if !params.IgnoreSub {
errs = append(errs, "missing or malformed 'sub' (subject, typically pairwise user id)")
}
} else if len(params.Sub) > 0 {
if params.Sub != claims.Sub {
errs = append(errs, fmt.Sprintf("'sub' (subject) mismatch: got %s, expected %s", claims.Sub, params.Sub))
}
}
// Required to exist and match
if len(params.Aud) > 0 || !params.IgnoreAud {
if len(claims.Aud) == 0 {
errs = append(errs, "missing or malformed 'aud' (audience receiving token)")
} else if claims.Aud != params.Aud {
errs = append(errs, fmt.Sprintf("'aud' (audience) mismatch: got %s, expected %s", claims.Aud, params.Aud))
}
}
// Required to exist and not be in the past
if !params.IgnoreExp {
if claims.Exp <= 0 {
errs = append(errs, "missing or malformed 'exp' (expiration date in seconds)")
} else if claims.Exp < params.Now.Unix() {
duration := time.Since(time.Unix(claims.Exp, 0))
expTime := time.Unix(claims.Exp, 0).Format("2006-01-02 15:04:05 MST")
errs = append(errs, fmt.Sprintf("token expired %s ago (%s)", formatDuration(duration), expTime))
}
}
// Required to exist and not be in the future
if !params.IgnoreIat {
if claims.Iat <= 0 {
errs = append(errs, "missing or malformed 'iat' (issued at, when token was signed)")
} else if claims.Iat > params.Now.Unix() {
duration := time.Unix(claims.Iat, 0).Sub(params.Now)
iatTime := time.Unix(claims.Iat, 0).Format("2006-01-02 15:04:05 MST")
errs = append(errs, fmt.Sprintf("'iat' (issued at) is %s in the future (%s)", formatDuration(duration), iatTime))
}
}
// Should exist, in the past, with optional max age
if params.MaxAge > 0 || !params.IgnoreAuthTime {
if claims.AuthTime == 0 {
errs = append(errs, "missing or malformed 'auth_time' (time of real-world user authentication, in seconds)")
} else {
authTime := time.Unix(claims.AuthTime, 0)
authTimeStr := authTime.Format("2006-01-02 15:04:05 MST")
age := params.Now.Sub(authTime)
diff := age - params.MaxAge
if claims.AuthTime > params.Now.Unix() {
fromNow := time.Unix(claims.AuthTime, 0).Sub(params.Now)
errs = append(errs, fmt.Sprintf(
"'auth_time' of %s is %s in the future (server time %s)",
authTimeStr, formatDuration(fromNow), params.Now.Format("2006-01-02 15:04:05 MST")),
)
} else if params.MaxAge > 0 && age > params.MaxAge {
errs = append(errs, fmt.Sprintf(
"'auth_time' of %s is %s old, exceeding max age %s by %s",
authTimeStr, formatDuration(age), formatDuration(params.MaxAge), formatDuration(diff)),
)
}
}
}
// Optional exact match
if params.Jti != claims.Jti {
if len(params.Jti) > 0 {
errs = append(errs, fmt.Sprintf("'jti' (jwt id) mismatch: got %s, expected %s", claims.Jti, params.Jti))
} else if !params.IgnoreJti {
errs = append(errs, fmt.Sprintf("unchecked 'jti' (jwt id): %s", claims.Jti))
}
}
// Optional exact match
if params.Nonce != claims.Nonce {
if len(params.Nonce) > 0 {
errs = append(errs, fmt.Sprintf("'nonce' mismatch: got %s, expected %s", claims.Nonce, params.Nonce))
} else if !params.IgnoreNonce {
errs = append(errs, fmt.Sprintf("unchecked 'nonce': %s", claims.Nonce))
}
}
// Should exist, optional required-set check
if !params.IgnoreAmr {
if len(claims.Amr) == 0 {
errs = append(errs, "missing or malformed 'amr' (authorization methods, as json list)")
} else if len(params.RequiredAmrs) > 0 {
for _, required := range params.RequiredAmrs {
if !slices.Contains(claims.Amr, required) {
errs = append(errs, fmt.Sprintf("missing required '%s' from 'amr'", required))
}
}
}
}
// Optional, match if present
if params.Azp != claims.Azp {
if len(params.Azp) > 0 {
errs = append(errs, fmt.Sprintf("'azp' (authorized party) mismatch: got %s, expected %s", claims.Azp, params.Azp))
} else if !params.IgnoreAzp {
errs = append(errs, fmt.Sprintf("unchecked 'azp' (authorized party): %s", claims.Azp))
}
}
if len(errs) > 0 {
return errs, fmt.Errorf("has errors")
}
return nil, nil
}
// --- Private key / signing helpers ---
// JWK represents a private key in JSON Web Key format (EC only).
type JWK struct {
Kty string `json:"kty"`
Crv string `json:"crv"`
D string `json:"d"`
X string `json:"x"`
Y string `json:"y"`
}
// UnmarshalJWK parses an EC private key from a JWK struct.
func UnmarshalJWK(jwk JWK) (*ecdsa.PrivateKey, error) {
x, err := base64.RawURLEncoding.DecodeString(jwk.X)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("invalid JWK X: %v", err)
}
y, err := base64.RawURLEncoding.DecodeString(jwk.Y)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("invalid JWK Y: %v", err)
}
d, err := base64.RawURLEncoding.DecodeString(jwk.D)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("invalid JWK D: %v", err)
}
return &ecdsa.PrivateKey{
PublicKey: ecdsa.PublicKey{
Curve: elliptic.P256(),
X: new(big.Int).SetBytes(x),
Y: new(big.Int).SetBytes(y),
},
D: new(big.Int).SetBytes(d),
}, nil
}
// Thumbprint computes the RFC 7638 JWK Thumbprint for an EC public key.
func (jwk JWK) Thumbprint() (string, error) {
data := map[string]string{
"crv": jwk.Crv,
"kty": jwk.Kty,
"x": jwk.X,
"y": jwk.Y,
}
jsonData, err := json.Marshal(data)
if err != nil {
return "", err
}
hash := sha256.Sum256(jsonData)
return base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString(hash[:]), nil
}
// SignES256 computes an ES256 signature over header.payload.
// The signature is a fixed-width raw r||s value (not ASN.1 DER).
// Each component is zero-padded to the curve's byte length.
func SignES256(header, payload string, key *ecdsa.PrivateKey) ([]byte, error) {
hash := sha256.Sum256([]byte(header + "." + payload))
r, s, err := ecdsa.Sign(rand.Reader, key, hash[:])
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("SignES256: %w", err)
}
byteLen := (key.Curve.Params().BitSize + 7) / 8
out := make([]byte, 2*byteLen)
r.FillBytes(out[:byteLen])
s.FillBytes(out[byteLen:])
return out, nil
}
// SignRS256 computes an RS256 (PKCS#1 v1.5 + SHA-256) signature over header.payload.
func SignRS256(header, payload string, key *rsa.PrivateKey) ([]byte, error) {
hash := sha256.Sum256([]byte(header + "." + payload))
sig, err := rsa.SignPKCS1v15(rand.Reader, key, crypto.SHA256, hash[:])
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("SignRS256: %w", err)
}
return sig, nil
}
// ecdsaDERToRaw converts an ASN.1 DER ECDSA signature (as returned by
// [crypto.Signer]) to the fixed-width r||s format required by JWS.
func ecdsaDERToRaw(der []byte, curve elliptic.Curve) ([]byte, error) {
var sig struct{ R, S *big.Int }
if _, err := asn1.Unmarshal(der, &sig); err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("ecdsaDERToRaw: %w", err)
}
byteLen := (curve.Params().BitSize + 7) / 8
out := make([]byte, 2*byteLen)
sig.R.FillBytes(out[:byteLen])
sig.S.FillBytes(out[byteLen:])
return out, nil
}
// EncodeToJWT appends a base64url-encoded signature to a signing input.
func EncodeToJWT(signingInput string, signature []byte) string {
sigEnc := base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString(signature)
return signingInput + "." + sigEnc
}
// URLBase64 is a []byte that marshals to/from raw base64url in JSON.
type URLBase64 []byte
func (s URLBase64) String() string {
return base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString(s)
}
func (s URLBase64) MarshalJSON() ([]byte, error) {
encoded := base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString(s)
return json.Marshal(encoded)
}
func (s *URLBase64) UnmarshalJSON(data []byte) error {
dst, err := base64.RawURLEncoding.AppendDecode([]byte{}, data)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("decode base64url signature: %w", err)
}
*s = dst
return nil
}
func formatDuration(d time.Duration) string {
if d < 0 {
d = -d
}
days := int(d / (24 * time.Hour))
d -= time.Duration(days) * 24 * time.Hour
hours := int(d / time.Hour)
d -= time.Duration(hours) * time.Hour
minutes := int(d / time.Minute)
d -= time.Duration(minutes) * time.Minute
seconds := int(d / time.Second)
var parts []string
if days > 0 {
parts = append(parts, fmt.Sprintf("%dd", days))
}
if hours > 0 {
parts = append(parts, fmt.Sprintf("%dh", hours))
}
if minutes > 0 {
parts = append(parts, fmt.Sprintf("%dm", minutes))
}
if seconds > 0 || len(parts) == 0 {
parts = append(parts, fmt.Sprintf("%ds", seconds))
}
if seconds == 0 || len(parts) == 0 {
d -= time.Duration(seconds) * time.Second
millis := int(d / time.Millisecond)
parts = append(parts, fmt.Sprintf("%dms", millis))
}
return strings.Join(parts, " ")
}

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// Copyright 2025 AJ ONeal <aj@therootcompany.com> (https://therootcompany.com)
//
// This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public
// License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this
// file, You can obtain one at https://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/.
//
// SPDX-License-Identifier: MPL-2.0
package genericjwt_test
import (
"crypto/ecdsa"
"crypto/elliptic"
"crypto/rand"
"crypto/rsa"
"fmt"
"testing"
"time"
"github.com/therootcompany/golib/auth/genericjwt"
)
// AppClaims is an example custom claims type that satisfies [genericjwt.Validatable]
// by explicitly delegating to [genericjwt.ValidateStandardClaims].
//
// Unlike embeddedjwt, there is no promoted Validate here — genericjwt's
// StandardClaims has no Validate method, so the application type always owns
// the implementation. This keeps the generics constraint explicit.
type AppClaims struct {
genericjwt.StandardClaims
Email string `json:"email"`
Roles []string `json:"roles"`
}
func (c AppClaims) Validate(params genericjwt.ValidateParams) ([]string, error) {
return genericjwt.ValidateStandardClaims(c.StandardClaims, params)
}
// StrictAppClaims adds an application-specific check (non-empty Email) on top
// of the standard OIDC validation.
type StrictAppClaims struct {
genericjwt.StandardClaims
Email string `json:"email"`
}
func (c StrictAppClaims) Validate(params genericjwt.ValidateParams) ([]string, error) {
errs, _ := genericjwt.ValidateStandardClaims(c.StandardClaims, params)
if c.Email == "" {
errs = append(errs, "missing email claim")
}
if len(errs) > 0 {
return errs, fmt.Errorf("has errors")
}
return nil, nil
}
func goodClaims() AppClaims {
now := time.Now()
return AppClaims{
StandardClaims: genericjwt.StandardClaims{
Iss: "https://example.com",
Sub: "user123",
Aud: "myapp",
Exp: now.Add(time.Hour).Unix(),
Iat: now.Unix(),
AuthTime: now.Unix(),
Amr: []string{"pwd"},
Jti: "abc123",
Azp: "myapp",
Nonce: "nonce1",
},
Email: "user@example.com",
Roles: []string{"admin"},
}
}
func goodParams() genericjwt.ValidateParams {
return genericjwt.ValidateParams{
Iss: "https://example.com",
Sub: "user123",
Aud: "myapp",
Jti: "abc123",
Nonce: "nonce1",
Azp: "myapp",
RequiredAmrs: []string{"pwd"},
}
}
// TestRoundTrip is the primary happy path demonstrating the core genericjwt
// ergonomic: Decode[AppClaims] places the type parameter at the call site and
// returns a JWS[AppClaims] whose Claims field is directly typed — no interface,
// no type assertion ever needed.
func TestRoundTrip(t *testing.T) {
privKey, err := ecdsa.GenerateKey(elliptic.P256(), rand.Reader)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
claims := goodClaims()
jws, err := genericjwt.NewJWSFromClaims(claims, "key-1")
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if _, err = jws.Sign(privKey); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if jws.Header.Alg != "ES256" {
t.Fatalf("expected ES256, got %s", jws.Header.Alg)
}
token := jws.Encode()
// Type parameter at the call site — no pre-allocated claims pointer needed.
jws2, err := genericjwt.Decode[AppClaims](token)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if !jws2.UnsafeVerify(&privKey.PublicKey) {
t.Fatal("signature verification failed")
}
if errs, err := jws2.Validate(goodParams()); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("validation failed: %v", errs)
}
// Direct field access on jws2.Claims — zero type assertions.
if jws2.Claims.Email != claims.Email {
t.Errorf("email: got %s, want %s", jws2.Claims.Email, claims.Email)
}
}
// TestRoundTripRS256 exercises RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 / RS256.
func TestRoundTripRS256(t *testing.T) {
privKey, err := rsa.GenerateKey(rand.Reader, 2048)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
claims := goodClaims()
jws, err := genericjwt.NewJWSFromClaims(claims, "key-1")
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if _, err = jws.Sign(privKey); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if jws.Header.Alg != "RS256" {
t.Fatalf("expected RS256, got %s", jws.Header.Alg)
}
token := jws.Encode()
jws2, err := genericjwt.Decode[AppClaims](token)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if !jws2.UnsafeVerify(&privKey.PublicKey) {
t.Fatal("signature verification failed")
}
if errs, err := jws2.Validate(goodParams()); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("validation failed: %v", errs)
}
}
// TestUnsafeVerifyWrongKey confirms that a different key's public key does
// not verify the signature.
func TestUnsafeVerifyWrongKey(t *testing.T) {
signingKey, _ := ecdsa.GenerateKey(elliptic.P256(), rand.Reader)
wrongKey, _ := ecdsa.GenerateKey(elliptic.P256(), rand.Reader)
claims := goodClaims()
jws, _ := genericjwt.NewJWSFromClaims(claims, "k")
_, _ = jws.Sign(signingKey)
token := jws.Encode()
jws2, _ := genericjwt.Decode[AppClaims](token)
if jws2.UnsafeVerify(&wrongKey.PublicKey) {
t.Fatal("expected verification to fail with wrong key")
}
}
// TestVerifyWrongKeyType confirms that an RSA key is rejected for an ES256 token.
func TestVerifyWrongKeyType(t *testing.T) {
ecKey, _ := ecdsa.GenerateKey(elliptic.P256(), rand.Reader)
rsaKey, _ := rsa.GenerateKey(rand.Reader, 2048)
claims := goodClaims()
jws, _ := genericjwt.NewJWSFromClaims(claims, "k")
_, _ = jws.Sign(ecKey)
token := jws.Encode()
jws2, _ := genericjwt.Decode[AppClaims](token)
if jws2.UnsafeVerify(&rsaKey.PublicKey) {
t.Fatal("expected verification to fail: RSA key for ES256 token")
}
}
// TestVerifyUnknownAlg confirms that a tampered alg header is rejected.
func TestVerifyUnknownAlg(t *testing.T) {
privKey, _ := ecdsa.GenerateKey(elliptic.P256(), rand.Reader)
claims := goodClaims()
jws, _ := genericjwt.NewJWSFromClaims(claims, "k")
_, _ = jws.Sign(privKey)
token := jws.Encode()
jws2, _ := genericjwt.Decode[AppClaims](token)
jws2.Header.Alg = "none"
if jws2.UnsafeVerify(&privKey.PublicKey) {
t.Fatal("expected verification to fail for unknown alg")
}
}
// TestValidateMissingSignatureCheck verifies that Validate fails when
// UnsafeVerify was never called (Verified is false).
func TestValidateMissingSignatureCheck(t *testing.T) {
privKey, _ := ecdsa.GenerateKey(elliptic.P256(), rand.Reader)
claims := goodClaims()
jws, _ := genericjwt.NewJWSFromClaims(claims, "k")
_, _ = jws.Sign(privKey)
token := jws.Encode()
jws2, _ := genericjwt.Decode[AppClaims](token)
// Deliberately skip UnsafeVerify.
errs, err := jws2.Validate(goodParams())
if err == nil {
t.Fatal("expected validation to fail: signature was not checked")
}
found := false
for _, e := range errs {
if e == "signature was not checked" {
found = true
}
}
if !found {
t.Fatalf("expected 'signature was not checked' in errors: %v", errs)
}
}
// TestVerifyWithJWKSKey verifies that PublicJWK[Key].Key can be passed
// directly to UnsafeVerify — the Key interface satisfies UnsafeVerify's
// parameter constraint without a type assertion.
func TestVerifyWithJWKSKey(t *testing.T) {
privKey, _ := ecdsa.GenerateKey(elliptic.P256(), rand.Reader)
jwksKey := genericjwt.PublicJWK[genericjwt.Key]{Key: &privKey.PublicKey, KID: "k1"}
claims := goodClaims()
jws, _ := genericjwt.NewJWSFromClaims(claims, "k1")
_, _ = jws.Sign(privKey)
token := jws.Encode()
jws2, _ := genericjwt.Decode[AppClaims](token)
if !jws2.UnsafeVerify(jwksKey.Key) {
t.Fatal("verification via PublicJWK.Key failed")
}
}
// TestDecodePublicJWKJSON verifies JWKS JSON parsing and TypedKeys filtering
// with real base64url-encoded key material from RFC 7517 / OIDC examples.
func TestDecodePublicJWKJSON(t *testing.T) {
jwksJSON := []byte(`{"keys":[
{"kty":"EC","crv":"P-256",
"x":"MKBCTNIcKUSDii11ySs3526iDZ8AiTo7Tu6KPAqv7D4",
"y":"4Etl6SRW2YiLUrN5vfvVHuhp7x8PxltmWWlbbM4IFyM",
"kid":"ec-256","use":"sig"},
{"kty":"RSA",
"n":"0vx7agoebGcQSuuPiLJXZptN9nndrQmbXEps2aiAFbWhM78LhWx4cbbfAAtVT86zwu1RK7aPFFxuhDR1L6tSoc_BJECPebWKRXjBZCiFV4n3oknjhMstn64tZ_2W-5JsGY4Hc5n9yBXArwl93lqt7_RN5w6Cf0h4QyQ5v-65YGjQR0_FDW2QvzqY368QQMicAtaSqzs8KJZgnYb9c7d0zgdAZHzu6qMQvRL5hajrn1n91CbOpbISD08qNLyrdkt-bFTWhAI4vMQFh6WeZu0fM4lFd2NcRwr3XPksINHaQ-G_xBniIqbw0Ls1jF44-csFCur-kEgU8awapJzKnqDKgw",
"e":"AQAB","kid":"rsa-2048","use":"sig"}
]}`)
keys, err := genericjwt.UnmarshalPublicJWKs(jwksJSON)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if len(keys) != 2 {
t.Fatalf("expected 2 keys, got %d", len(keys))
}
ecKeys := genericjwt.TypedKeys[*ecdsa.PublicKey](keys)
if len(ecKeys) != 1 || ecKeys[0].KID != "ec-256" {
t.Errorf("EC key mismatch: %+v", ecKeys)
}
rsaKeys := genericjwt.TypedKeys[*rsa.PublicKey](keys)
if len(rsaKeys) != 1 || rsaKeys[0].KID != "rsa-2048" {
t.Errorf("RSA key mismatch: %+v", rsaKeys)
}
}

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auth/genericjwt/pub.go Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,229 @@
// Copyright 2025 AJ ONeal <aj@therootcompany.com> (https://therootcompany.com)
//
// This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public
// License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this
// file, You can obtain one at https://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/.
//
// SPDX-License-Identifier: MPL-2.0
package genericjwt
import (
"crypto"
"crypto/ecdsa"
"crypto/elliptic"
"crypto/rsa"
"encoding/base64"
"encoding/json"
"fmt"
"io"
"math/big"
"net/http"
"os"
"time"
)
// Key is the constraint for the public key type parameter K used in PublicJWK.
//
// All standard-library asymmetric public key types satisfy this interface
// since Go 1.15: *ecdsa.PublicKey, *rsa.PublicKey, ed25519.PublicKey.
//
// Note: crypto.PublicKey is defined as interface{} and does NOT satisfy Key.
// Use Key itself as the type argument for heterogeneous collections
// (e.g. []PublicJWK[Key]), since Key declares Equal and therefore satisfies
// its own constraint. Use [TypedKeys] to narrow to a concrete type.
type Key interface {
Equal(x crypto.PublicKey) bool
}
// PublicJWK wraps a parsed public key with its JWKS metadata.
//
// K is constrained to [Key], providing type-safe access to the underlying
// key without a type assertion at each use site.
//
// For a heterogeneous JWKS endpoint (mixed RSA/EC) use PublicJWK[Key].
// For a homogeneous store use the concrete type directly (e.g.
// PublicJWK[*ecdsa.PublicKey]). Use [TypedKeys] to narrow a mixed slice.
//
// Example — sign with a known key type, no assertion needed:
//
// ecKeys := genericjwt.TypedKeys[*ecdsa.PublicKey](allKeys)
// jws.UnsafeVerify(ecKeys[0].Key) // Key is *ecdsa.PublicKey directly
type PublicJWK[K Key] struct {
Key K
KID string
Use string
}
// PublicJWKJSON is the JSON representation of a single key in a JWKS document.
type PublicJWKJSON struct {
Kty string `json:"kty"`
KID string `json:"kid"`
N string `json:"n,omitempty"` // RSA modulus
E string `json:"e,omitempty"` // RSA exponent
Crv string `json:"crv,omitempty"`
X string `json:"x,omitempty"`
Y string `json:"y,omitempty"`
Use string `json:"use,omitempty"`
}
// JWKsJSON is the JSON representation of a JWKS document.
type JWKsJSON struct {
Keys []PublicJWKJSON `json:"keys"`
}
// TypedKeys filters a heterogeneous []PublicJWK[Key] slice to only those whose
// underlying key is of concrete type K, returning a typed []PublicJWK[K].
// Keys of other types are silently skipped.
//
// Example — extract only ECDSA keys from a mixed JWKS result:
//
// all, _ := genericjwt.FetchPublicJWKs(jwksURL)
// ecKeys := genericjwt.TypedKeys[*ecdsa.PublicKey](all)
// rsaKeys := genericjwt.TypedKeys[*rsa.PublicKey](all)
func TypedKeys[K Key](keys []PublicJWK[Key]) []PublicJWK[K] {
var result []PublicJWK[K]
for _, k := range keys {
if typed, ok := k.Key.(K); ok {
result = append(result, PublicJWK[K]{Key: typed, KID: k.KID, Use: k.Use})
}
}
return result
}
// FetchPublicJWKs retrieves and parses a JWKS document from url.
// Keys are returned as []PublicJWK[Key] since a JWKS endpoint may contain a
// mix of key types. Use [TypedKeys] to narrow to a concrete type.
func FetchPublicJWKs(url string) ([]PublicJWK[Key], error) {
client := &http.Client{Timeout: 10 * time.Second}
resp, err := client.Get(url)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to fetch JWKS: %w", err)
}
defer func() { _ = resp.Body.Close() }()
if resp.StatusCode != http.StatusOK {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("unexpected status code: %d", resp.StatusCode)
}
return DecodePublicJWKs(resp.Body)
}
// ReadPublicJWKs reads and parses a JWKS document from a file path.
func ReadPublicJWKs(filePath string) ([]PublicJWK[Key], error) {
file, err := os.Open(filePath)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to open JWKS file '%s': %w", filePath, err)
}
defer func() { _ = file.Close() }()
return DecodePublicJWKs(file)
}
// UnmarshalPublicJWKs parses a JWKS document from raw JSON bytes.
func UnmarshalPublicJWKs(data []byte) ([]PublicJWK[Key], error) {
var jwks JWKsJSON
if err := json.Unmarshal(data, &jwks); err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to parse JWKS JSON: %w", err)
}
return DecodePublicJWKsJSON(jwks)
}
// DecodePublicJWKs parses a JWKS document from an [io.Reader].
func DecodePublicJWKs(r io.Reader) ([]PublicJWK[Key], error) {
var jwks JWKsJSON
if err := json.NewDecoder(r).Decode(&jwks); err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to parse JWKS JSON: %w", err)
}
return DecodePublicJWKsJSON(jwks)
}
// DecodePublicJWKsJSON converts a parsed [JWKsJSON] into typed public keys.
func DecodePublicJWKsJSON(jwks JWKsJSON) ([]PublicJWK[Key], error) {
var keys []PublicJWK[Key]
for _, jwk := range jwks.Keys {
key, err := DecodePublicJWK(jwk)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to parse public jwk '%s': %w", jwk.KID, err)
}
keys = append(keys, *key)
}
if len(keys) == 0 {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("no valid RSA or ECDSA keys found")
}
return keys, nil
}
// DecodePublicJWK parses a single [PublicJWKJSON] into a PublicJWK[Key].
// Supports RSA (minimum 1024-bit) and EC (P-256, P-384, P-521) keys.
func DecodePublicJWK(jwk PublicJWKJSON) (*PublicJWK[Key], error) {
switch jwk.Kty {
case "RSA":
key, err := decodeRSAPublicJWK(jwk)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to parse RSA key '%s': %w", jwk.KID, err)
}
if key.Size() < 128 { // 1024 bits minimum
return nil, fmt.Errorf("RSA key '%s' too small: %d bytes", jwk.KID, key.Size())
}
return &PublicJWK[Key]{Key: key, KID: jwk.KID, Use: jwk.Use}, nil
case "EC":
key, err := decodeECDSAPublicJWK(jwk)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to parse EC key '%s': %w", jwk.KID, err)
}
return &PublicJWK[Key]{Key: key, KID: jwk.KID, Use: jwk.Use}, nil
default:
return nil, fmt.Errorf("unsupported key type '%s' for kid '%s'", jwk.Kty, jwk.KID)
}
}
func decodeRSAPublicJWK(jwk PublicJWKJSON) (*rsa.PublicKey, error) {
n, err := base64.RawURLEncoding.DecodeString(jwk.N)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("invalid RSA modulus: %w", err)
}
e, err := base64.RawURLEncoding.DecodeString(jwk.E)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("invalid RSA exponent: %w", err)
}
eInt := new(big.Int).SetBytes(e).Int64()
if eInt > int64(^uint(0)>>1) || eInt < 0 {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("RSA exponent too large or negative")
}
return &rsa.PublicKey{
N: new(big.Int).SetBytes(n),
E: int(eInt),
}, nil
}
func decodeECDSAPublicJWK(jwk PublicJWKJSON) (*ecdsa.PublicKey, error) {
x, err := base64.RawURLEncoding.DecodeString(jwk.X)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("invalid ECDSA X: %w", err)
}
y, err := base64.RawURLEncoding.DecodeString(jwk.Y)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("invalid ECDSA Y: %w", err)
}
var curve elliptic.Curve
switch jwk.Crv {
case "P-256":
curve = elliptic.P256()
case "P-384":
curve = elliptic.P384()
case "P-521":
curve = elliptic.P521()
default:
return nil, fmt.Errorf("unsupported ECDSA curve: %s", jwk.Crv)
}
return &ecdsa.PublicKey{
Curve: curve,
X: new(big.Int).SetBytes(x),
Y: new(big.Int).SetBytes(y),
}, nil
}